


Better SMT Proofs for Easier Reconstruction

AITP 2019, Obergurgl – Austria


Haniel Barbosa, Jasmin Christian Blanchette, Mathias Fleury, Pascal Fontaine,
Hans-Jörg Schurr

April 10, 2019


An Adventure



An Adventure



An Adventure





Proof Reconstruction in Isabelle/HOL

- ▶ Proof automation allows faster proof development
- ▶ One approach:
 1. Encode proof obligation into SMT-LIB
 2. Call an ATP
 3. Reconstruct the resulting proof
- ▶ Implemented by the `smt` tactic in Isabelle/HOL using Z3
 - ▶ Reconstruction can fail
 - ▶ Restricted to Z3
 - ▶ We want perfect reconstruction

```
theory Example
  imports Main
begin

lemma
  assumes
    <math>\langle \wedge xs\ x\ ys.\ xs @ x \# ys = x1 @ xs2 @ x2 \# ys' \Rightarrow P\ ys' \rangle</math>
  shows <math>P\ ys'</math>
  using assms [[smt_trace, smt_solver=z3]]
  by (smt append.assoc)

end
```

8.16 (127/201) (isabelle.isabelle.UTF-8-isabelle) | n m r o UG 270/594MB 3:08 p.m.

Assisting Proof Construction

- ▶ Built-in methods
 - ▶ LCF approach
 - ▶ Checked by the prover kernel
 - ▶ In Isabelle: `auto`, `metis`, ...
- ▶ External automation:
 - ▶ `smt` with Z3 in Isabelle, `SMTCoq`
 - ▶ Hammers: Sledgehammer, HOL(y)Hammer, CoqHammer



The SMT Solver veriT

- ▶ Traditional CDCL(T) solver
- ▶ Supports:
 - ▶ Uninterpreted functions
 - ▶ Linear Arithmetic
 - ▶ Non-Linear Arithmetic
 - ▶ Quantifiers
 - ▶ ...
- ▶ Proof producing
- ▶ SMT-LIB input

```
(set-option :produce-proofs true)
(set-logic AUFLIA)
(declare-sort A$ 0)
(declare-sort A_list$ 0)
(declare-fun p$ (A_list$) Bool)
(declare-fun x1$ () A_list$)
(declare-fun x2$ () A$)
(declare-fun ys$ () A_list$)
(declare-fun xs2$ () A_list$)
(declare-fun cons$ (A$ A_list$) A_list$)
(declare-fun append$ (A_list$ A_list$) A_list$)
(assert (! (forall ((?v0 A_list$) (?v1 A_list$)
  (?v2 A_list$)) (= (append$ (append$ ?v0 ?v1) ?v2)
  (append$ ?v0 (append$ ?v1 ?v2)))) :named a0))
(assert (! (forall ((?v0 A_list$) (?v1 A$)
  (?v2 A_list$)) (=> (= (append$ ?v0 (cons$ ?v1 ?v2))
  (append$ x1$ (append$ xs2$ (cons$ x2$ ys$))))
  (p$ ys$))) :named a1))
(assert (! (not (p$ ys$)) :named a2))
(check-sat)
(get-proof)
```

Proofs from SMT Solvers


Use Cases

- ▶ Learning from proofs:
 - ▶ guidance: (FE)MaLeCoP, rICoP (reinforcement learning), ...
 - ▶ see also Daniel's talk
- ▶ Unsatisfiable cores
- ▶ Finding interpolants
- ▶ Result certification if the problem is unsatisfiable
- ▶ Debugging

Proof Generating SMT Solvers

CVC4 (LFSC, no proofs for quantifiers), Z3 (SMT-LIB based proof trees, coarser steps, esp. for skolemization), veriT, ArchSAT, ZenonModulo (Deducti), ...

Setting Sails




veriT's Proofs

```
(assume h1 (not (p a)))
(assume h2 (forall ((z1 U)) (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))))
...
(anchor :step t9 :args ((:= z2 veriT_vr4)))
(step t9.t1 (cl (= z2 veriT_vr4)) :rule refl)
(step t9.t2 (cl (= (p z2) (p veriT_vr4))) :rule cong :premises (t9.t1))
(step t9 (cl (= (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))
               (forall ((veriT_vr4 U)) (p veriT_vr4)))) :rule bind)
...
(step t14 (cl (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5)))
         :rule th_resolution :premises (t11 t12 t13))
(step t15 (cl (or (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a)))
         :rule forall_inst :args ((:= veriT_vr5 a)))
(step t16 (cl (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a))
         :rule or :premises (t15))
(step t17 (cl) :rule resolution :premises (t16 h1 t14))
```

veriT's Proofs

Input assumptions




```
(assume h1 (not (p a)))
(assume h2 (forall ((z1 U)) (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))))
...
(anchor :step t9 :args ((:= z2 veriT_vr4)))
(step t9.t1 (cl (= z2 veriT_vr4)) :rule refl)
(step t9.t2 (cl (= (p z2) (p veriT_vr4))) :rule cong :premises (t9.t1))
(step t9 (cl (= (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))
                (forall ((veriT_vr4 U)) (p veriT_vr4)))) :rule bind)
...
(step t14 (cl (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5)))
          :rule th_resolution :premises (t11 t12 t13))
(step t15 (cl (or (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a)))
          :rule forall_inst :args ((:= veriT_vr5 a)))
(step t16 (cl (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a))
          :rule or :premises (t15))
(step t17 (cl) :rule resolution :premises (t16 h1 t14))
```

veriT's Proofs

```
(assume h1 (not (p a)))
(assume h2 (forall ((z1 U) Simple step ((z2 U)) (p z2))))
...
(anchor :step t9 :args ((:= z2 veriT_vr4)))
(step t9.t1 (cl (= z2 veriT_vr4)) :rule refl)
(step t9.t2 (cl (= (p z2) (p veriT_vr4))) :rule cong :premises (t9.t1))
(step t9 (cl (= (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))
               (forall ((veriT_vr4 U)) (p veriT_vr4)))) :rule bind)
...
(step t14 (cl (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5)))
         :rule th_resolution :premises (t11 t12 t13))
(step t15 (cl (or (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a)))
         :rule forall_inst :args ((:= veriT_vr5 a)))
(step t16 (cl (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a))
         :rule or :premises (t15))
(step t17 (cl) :rule resolution :premises (t16 h1 t14))
```

veriT's Proofs

```
(assume h1 (not (p a)))
(assume h2 (forall ((z1 U)) (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))))
...
(anchor :step t9 :args ((:= z2 veriT_vr4)))
(step t9.t1 (cl (= z2 veriT_vr4)) :rule refl)
(step t9.t2 (cl (= (p z2) (p veriT_vr4))) :rule cong :premises (t9.t1))
(step t9 (cl (= (forall ((z Name (p z2))
                (forall ((veriT_vr4 U)) (p veriT_vr4)))) :rule bind)
...
(step t14 (cl (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5)))
          :rule th_resolution :premises (t11 t12 t13))
(step t15 (cl (or (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a)))
          :rule forall_inst :args ((:= veriT_vr5 a)))
(step t16 (cl (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a))
          :rule or :premises (t15))
(step t17 (cl) :rule resolution :premises (t16 h1 t14))
```




veriT's Proofs

```
(assume h1 (not (p a)))
(assume h2 (forall ((z1 U)) (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))))
...
(anchor :step t9 :args ((:= z2 veriT_vr4)))
(step t9.t1 (cl (= z2 veriT_vr4)) :rule refl)
(step t9.t2 (cl (= (p z2) (p veriT_vr4))) :rule cong :premises (t9.t1))
(step t9 (cl (= (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))
               (forall ((veriT_vr4 U)) (p veriT_vr4)))) :rule bind)
...
(step t14 (cl (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5)))
          :rule th_resolution :premises (t11 t12 t13))
(step t15 (cl (or (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a)))
          :rule forall_inst :args ((:= veriT_vr5 a)))
(step t16 (cl (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a))
          :rule or :premises (t15))
(step t17 (cl) :rule resolution :premises (t16 h1 t14))
```


veriT's Proofs

```
(assume h1 (not (p a)))
(assume h2 (forall ((z1 U)) (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))))
...
(anchor :step t9 :args ((:= z2 veriT_vr4)))
(step t9.t1 (cl (= z2 veriT_vr4)) :rule refl)
(step t9.t2 (cl (= (p z2) (p veriT_vr4))) :rule cong :premises (t9.t1))
(step t9 (cl (= (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))
               (forall ((veriT_vr4 U)) (p veriT_vr4)))) :rule bind)
...
(step t14 (cl (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5)))
         :rule th_resolution :premises (t11 t12 t13))
(step t15 (cl (or (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a)))
         :rule forall_inst :args ((:= veriT_vr5 a)))
(step t16 (cl (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a))
         :rule or :premises (t15))
(step t17 (cl) :rule resolution :premises (t16 h1 t14))
```



veriT's Proofs

```
(assume h1 (not (p a)))
(assume h2 (forall ((z1 U)) (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))))
...
(anchor :step t9 :args ((:= z2 veriT_vr4)))
(step t9.t1 (cl (= z2 veriT_vr4)) :rule refl)
(step t9.t2 (cl (= (p z2) (p veriT_vr4))) :rule cong :premises (t9.t1))
(step t9 (cl (= (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))
               (forall ((veriT_vr4 U)) (p veriT_vr4)))) :rule bind)
...
(step t14 (cl (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5)))
          :rule th_resolution :premises (t11 t12 t13))
(step t15 (cl (or (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a)))
          :rule forall_inst :args ((:= veriT_vr5 a)))
(step t16 (cl (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a))
          :rule or :premises (t15))
(step t17 (cl) :rule resolution :premises (t16 h1 t14))
```



veriT's Proofs

```
(assume h1 (not (p a)))
(assume h2 (forall ((z1 U)) (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))))
...
(anchor :step t9 :args ((:= z2 veriT_vr4)))
(step t9.t1 (cl (= z2 veriT_vr4)) :rule refl)
(step t9.t2 (cl (= (p z2) (p veriT_vr4))) Context annotation ses (t9.t1))
(step t9 (cl (= (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))
                (forall ((veriT_vr4 U)) (p veriT_vr4)))) :rule bind)
...
(step t14 (cl (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5)))
          :rule th_resolution :premises (t11 t12 t13))
(step t15 (cl (or (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a)))
          :rule forall_inst :args ((:= veriT_vr5 a)))
(step t16 (cl (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a))
          :rule or :premises (t15))
(step t17 (cl) :rule resolution :premises (t16 h1 t14))
```

veriT's Proofs

```
(assume h1 (not (p a)))
(assm
...
(anc1
(step t9.t1 (cl (= z2 veriT_vr4)) :rule refl)
(step t9.t2 (cl (= (p z2) (p veriT_vr4))) :rule cong :premises (t9.t1))
(step t9 (cl (= (forall ((z2 U)) (p z2))
                (forall ((veriT_vr4 U)) (p veriT_vr4)))) :rule bind)
...
(step t14 (cl (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5)))
          :rule th_resolution :premises (t11 t12 t13))
(step t15 (cl (or (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a)))
          :rule forall_inst :args ((:= veriT_vr5 a)))
(step t16 (cl (not (forall ((veriT_vr5 U)) (p veriT_vr5))) (p a))
          :rule or :premises (t15))
(step t17 (cl) :rule resolution :premises (t16 h1 t14))
```

Skolemization is done by showing lemmas of the form
 $(\exists x.P[x]) = P[(\epsilon x.P)/x]$


Collaborate

Given that we are both developers of the SMT solver and the reconstruction, many problems (bugs, unclarities, etc.) can be solved on short notice.


Documentation

- ▶ Automatically generated: `--proof-format-and-exit`
 - ▶ Necessarily contains all rules
- ▶ Past publications (Besson et al. 2011, Déharbe et al. 2011, Barbosa et al. 2019)

The Reconstruction Inside Isabelle/HOL



The Reconstruction Inside Isabelle/HOL



Direct Proof Rules

- ▶ Assume $A \Rightarrow B$ is applied
- ▶ We assume A
- ▶ We derive B'
- ▶ then `simp/fast/blast` to discharge $B' \Rightarrow B$

Hand-described Rules

- ▶ Call specific tactic for specific rules
- ▶ Some simplification (for speed)
- ▶ Terminal tactics

Reconstruction

Direct Proof Rules

- ▶ Assume $A \Rightarrow B$ is applied
- ▶ We assume A
- ▶ We derive B'
- ▶ then `simp/fast/blast` to discharge $B' \Rightarrow B$


Hand-described Rules

- ▶ Call specific tactic for specific rules
- ▶ Some simplification (for speed)
- ▶ Terminal tactics

Challenges

- ▶ `arith` is too weak to reliably reconstruct the current arithmetic step
- ▶ Skolemization
- ▶ The `connective_equiv` rule:
 - ▶ Encodes “trivial” truth about theory connectives
 - ▶ First attempt to solve on the propositional level
 - ▶ Then try automation
- ▶ Implicit steps
 - ▶ Order of `=` is freely changed
 - ▶ Step simplification:
 - $a \approx b \wedge a \approx b \Rightarrow f(a, a) \approx f(b, b)$
 - $a \approx b \Rightarrow f(a, a) \approx f(b, b)$
 - ▶ Double negation is eliminated

Weight: Proof Size





Weight: Proof Size

- ▶ Proofs are often huge
- ▶ Linear presentation unrolls shared terms
 - ▶ The choice terms introduced by skolemization can be huge
- ▶ veriT proofs support optional sharing
- ▶ Utilizes `(! t :named n)` syntax of SMT-LIB

Where to introduce names?

- ▶ Perfect solution is hard to find
- ▶ Approximate: Terms which appear with two different parents get a name
 - ▶ $f(h(a), j(x, y)), g(h(a)), g(f(h(a), j(x, y)))$
 - ▶ $[f([h(a)]_{p_2}, j(x, y))]_{p_1}, [g(p_2)]_{p_3}, [g(p_1)]_{p_4}$
- ▶ Can be done in linear time thanks to perfect sharing

Isabelle/HOL side

- ▶ Isabelle/HOL unfolds everything
- ▶ ... except for skolem terms where the name is used.


Proof Without Sharing

```
(assume h1 (and (forall ((?veriT.veriT__4 Client) (?veriT.veriT__3 Client)) (= ?veriT.veriT__4 ?veriT.veriT__3)) (not (= c1 c2))))
(anchor :step t2 :args ((:= ?veriT.veriT__4 veriT_vr0) (:= ?veriT.veriT__3 veriT_vr1)))
(step t2.t1 (cl (= ?veriT.veriT__4 veriT_vr0)) :rule refl)
(step t2.t2 (cl (= ?veriT.veriT__3 veriT_vr1)) :rule refl)
(step t2.t3 (cl (= (= ?veriT.veriT__4 ?veriT.veriT__3) (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr1))) :rule cong :premises (t2.t1 t2.t2))
(step t2 (cl (= (forall ((?veriT.veriT__4 Client) (?veriT.veriT__3 Client)) (= ?veriT.veriT__4 ?veriT.veriT__3)) (forall ((veriT_vr0 Client) (veriT_vr1 Client)) (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr1)))) :rule bind)
(step t3 (cl (= (and (forall ((?veriT.veriT__4 Client) (?veriT.veriT__3 Client)) (= ?veriT.veriT__4 ?veriT.veriT__3)) (not (= c1 c2))) (and (forall ((veriT_vr0 Client) (veriT_vr1 Client)) (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr1)) (not (= c1 c2)))))) :rule cong :premises (t2))
(step t4 (cl (not (= (and (forall ((?veriT.veriT__4 Client) (?veriT.veriT__3 Client)) (= ?veriT.veriT__4 ?veriT.veriT__3)) (not (= c1 c2))) (and (forall ((veriT_vr0 Client) (veriT_vr1 Client)) (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr1)) (not (= c1 c2)))))) (not (and (forall ((?veriT.veriT__4 Client) (?veriT.veriT__3 Client)) (= ?veriT.veriT__4 ?veriT.veriT__3)) (not (= c1 c2)))) (and (forall ((veriT_vr0 Client) (veriT_vr1 Client)) (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr1)) (not (= c1 c2)))))) :rule equiv_pos2)
(step t5 (cl (and (forall ((veriT_vr0 Client) (veriT_vr1 Client)) (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr1)) (not (= c1 c2)))) :rule th_resolution :premises (h1 t3 t4))
(anchor :step t6 :args ((:= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr2) (:= veriT_vr1 veriT_vr3)))
(step t6.t1 (cl (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr2)) :rule refl)
(step t6.t2 (cl (= veriT_vr1 veriT_vr3)) :rule refl)
(step t6.t3 (cl (= (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr1) (= veriT_vr2 veriT_vr3))) :rule cong :premises (t6.t1 t6.t2))
(step t6 (cl (= (forall ((veriT_vr0 Client) (veriT_vr1 Client)) (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr1)) (forall ((veriT_vr2 Client) (veriT_vr3 Client)) (= veriT_vr2 veriT_vr3)))) :rule bind)
(step t7 (cl (= (and (forall ((veriT_vr0 Client) (veriT_vr1 Client)) (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr1)) (not (= c1 c2))) (and (forall ((veriT_vr2 Client) (veriT_vr3 Client)) (= veriT_vr2 veriT_vr3)) (not (= c1 c2)))))) :rule cong :premises (t6))
(step t8 (cl (not (= (and (forall ((veriT_vr0 Client) (veriT_vr1 Client)) (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr1)) (not (= c1 c2))) (and (forall ((veriT_vr2 Client) (veriT_vr3 Client)) (= veriT_vr2 veriT_vr3)) (not (= c1 c2)))))) (not (and (forall ((veriT_vr0 Client) (veriT_vr1 Client)) (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr1)) (not (= c1 c2)))) (and (forall ((veriT_vr2 Client) (veriT_vr3 Client)) (= veriT_vr2 veriT_vr3)) (not (= c1 c2)))))) :rule equiv_pos2)
(step t9 (cl (and (forall ((veriT_vr2 Client) (veriT_vr3 Client)) (= veriT_vr2 veriT_vr3)) (not (= c1 c2)))) :rule th_resolution :premises (t5 t7 t8))
(step t10 (cl (forall ((veriT_vr2 Client) (veriT_vr3 Client)) (= veriT_vr2 veriT_vr3))) :rule and :premises (t9))
(step t11 (cl (not (= c1 c2))) :rule and :premises (t9))
(step t12 (cl (or (not (forall ((veriT_vr2 Client) (veriT_vr3 Client)) (= veriT_vr2 veriT_vr3))) (= c1 c2))) :rule forall_inst :args ((:= veriT_vr2 c2) (:= veriT_vr3 c1)))
(step t13 (cl (not (forall ((veriT_vr2 Client) (veriT_vr3 Client)) (= veriT_vr2 veriT_vr3))) (= c1 c2))) :rule or :premises (t12))
```

Proof With Sharing

```
(assume h1 (! (and (! (forall ((?veriT.veriT__4 Client) (?veriT.veriT__3 Client)) (! (= ?veriT.veriT__4 ?veriT.veriT__3)
: named @p_3)) : named @p_2) (! (not (! (= c1 c2) : named @p_5)) : named @p_4)) : named @p_1))
(anchor :step t2 :args ((:= ?veriT.veriT__4 veriT_vr0) (:= ?veriT.veriT__3 veriT_vr1)))
(step t2.t1 (c1 (! (= ?veriT.veriT__4 veriT_vr0) : named @p_6)) :rule refl)
(step t2.t2 (c1 (! (= ?veriT.veriT__3 veriT_vr1) : named @p_7)) :rule refl)
(step t2.t3 (c1 (! (= @p_3 (! (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr1) : named @p_9)) : named @p_8)) :rule cong :premises (t2.t1 t2.t2))
(step t2 (c1 (! (= @p_2 (! (forall ((veriT_vr0 Client) (veriT_vr1 Client)) @p_9) : named @p_11)) : named @p_10)) :rule bind)
(step t3 (c1 (! (= @p_1 (! (and @p_11 @p_4) : named @p_13)) : named @p_12)) :rule cong :premises (t2))
(step t4 (c1 (! (not @p_12) : named @p_14) (! (not @p_1) : named @p_15) @p_13) :rule equiv_pos2)
(step t5 (c1 @p_13) :rule th_resolution :premises (h1 t3 t4))
(anchor :step t6 :args ((:= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr2) (:= veriT_vr1 veriT_vr3)))
(step t6.t1 (c1 (! (= veriT_vr0 veriT_vr2) : named @p_16)) :rule refl)
(step t6.t2 (c1 (! (= veriT_vr1 veriT_vr3) : named @p_17)) :rule refl)
(step t6.t3 (c1 (! (= @p_9 (! (= veriT_vr2 veriT_vr3) : named @p_19)) : named @p_18)) :rule cong :premises (t6.t1 t6.t2))
(step t6 (c1 (! (= @p_11 (! (forall ((veriT_vr2 Client) (veriT_vr3 Client)) @p_19) : named @p_21)) : named @p_20)) :rule bind)
(step t7 (c1 (! (= @p_13 (! (and @p_21 @p_4) : named @p_23)) : named @p_22)) :rule cong :premises (t6))
(step t8 (c1 (! (not @p_22) : named @p_24) (! (not @p_13) : named @p_25) @p_23) :rule equiv_pos2)
(step t9 (c1 @p_23) :rule th_resolution :premises (t5 t7 t8))
(step t10 (c1 @p_21) :rule and :premises (t9))
(step t11 (c1 @p_4) :rule and :premises (t9))
(step t12 (c1 (! (or (! (not @p_21) : named @p_27) @p_5) : named @p_26)) :rule forall_inst :args ((:= veriT_vr2 c2) (:=
veriT_vr3 c1)))
(step t13 (c1 @p_27 @p_5) :rule or :premises (t12))
(step t14 (c1) :rule resolution :premises (t13 t10 t11))
```

Proof Rot





Proof Rot

At the beginning everything was fine and veriT produced the step:

$$\forall x.p[x] \rightarrow p[t]$$



At the beginning everything was fine and veriT produced the step:

$$\forall x. p[x] \rightarrow p[t]$$

Then: «If we have $\forall x. (p_1 \wedge p_2 \wedge p_3)$ we can produce $\forall x. (p_1 \wedge p_2 \wedge p_3) \rightarrow p_i[t]$.»

- ▶ Only a few lines of code change
- ▶ This change was done a while ago
- ▶ Without reconstruction we would never have known



At the beginning everything was fine and veriT produced the step:

$$\forall x. p[x] \rightarrow p[t]$$


Then: «If we have $\forall x. (p_1 \wedge p_2 \wedge p_3)$ we can produce $\forall x. (p_1 \wedge p_2 \wedge p_3) \rightarrow p_i[t]$.»

- ▶ Only a few lines of code change
- ▶ This change was done a while ago
- ▶ Without reconstruction we would never have known

Since then: Under some circumstances $p[x]$ is a CNF of another formula.

- ▶ Reconstruction forces you to stay honest

Where We Are Now



Land in sight!

Where We Are Now

Test on `smt` calls in the AFP:

- ▶ Hence, only theorems easy for Z3
- ▶ 498 calls, 447 proofs produced by veriT
- ▶ 443 proofs reconstructed
- ▶ Average solving time 303ms
- ▶ Average reconstruction time 679.4ms

Test on `smt` calls in the AFP:

- ▶ Hence, only theorems easy for Z3
- ▶ 498 calls, 447 proofs produced by veriT
- ▶ 443 proofs reconstructed
- ▶ Average solving time 303ms
- ▶ Average reconstruction time 679.4ms




Outlook

- ▶ Perfect reconstruction
- ▶ Isabelle/HOL as a certifier
- ▶ Long term: A widely accepted format

Thank you for your attention!

- ▶ Questions? Suggestions?
- ▶ What would you like to see in the generated proofs?

References I

-  Besson, Frédéric, Pascal Fontaine, and Laurent Théry (2011). “A Flexible Proof Format for SMT: a Proposal”. In: *PxTP 2011*. Ed. by Pascal Fontaine and Aaron Stump, pp. 15–26.
-  Déharbe, David, Pascal Fontaine, and Bruno Woltzenlogel Paleo (2011). “Quantifier Inference Rules for SMT proofs”. In: *PxTP 2011*. Ed. by Pascal Fontaine and Aaron Stump, pp. 33–39. URL: <https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00642535>.
-  Barbosa, Haniel et al. (2019). “Scalable Fine-Grained Proofs for Formula Processing”. In: *J. Automated Reasoning*.